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PROVING !Nvrron's BREACH OF DuTY BY CmcuMsTANTIAL

EVIDENCE-Plaintiff brought a negligence action for personal injuries suffered
when she slipped on a spot of grease in the driveway of defendant's railroad
station. The evidence showed that the spot was at least one foot square and
was covered with dust and dirt so that it resembled in color and texture the rest
of the pavement. The evidence also indicated that vehicles often drove through
and parked in the drive, and that there were no marks on the spot other than
a deep skid mark left by plaintiff's heel. The trial court allowed the jury to
determine from this evidence that the spot had existed long enough for the
defendant, in the exercise of due care, to find and remove it. The defendant's
motion for a judgment n.0:11. was overruled. The intermediate appellate court
unanimously affi.rmed.1 On appeal, held, reversed. ''It is clear .•. that it could
not be determined from any or all of the circumstances and at best it would only
be a guess whether the grease spot was on the driveway IO minutes, IO hours
or IO days prior to the plaintiff's accident." Two judges dissented. Lanni 11.
Pennsylvania R. Co., (Pa. 1952) 88 A. (2d) 887 at 889.
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily hami caused to business
visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he •.. knows,
or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if
known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them.•. .''2
It was conceded in the principal case that the plaintiff was a business visitor

1170 Pa. Super. 81, 84 A. (2d) 242 (1951).
2 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §343 (1934).
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upon the property of the defendant, that the spot constituted an unreasonable
risk, and that the defendant had no actual knowledge of the existence of the
spot. The only issue was whether the evidence supported the jury's :6.nding
that the defendant was negligent in failing to discover the spot. Since breach
of duty is ordinarily a jury question, 3 the trial court was correct in sending the
case to the jury unless the evidence was so slight that it would be unreasonable
to infer that the spot had been on the driveway long enough for the defendant
to have discovered it. The issue arose upon the denial of the defendant's
motion for a judgment n.o.v., which in Pennsylvania basically raises the question of whether the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant.4
In considering either type of motion the court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. 5 Admittedly
the plaintiff submitted no direct evidence as to how long the grease had been
on the drive. 6 However, it is clear that breach of duty may be inferred by the
jury from circumstantial evidence, provided the inference is reasonable and
logical.7 The evidence showed that the grease was located on the usual exit
from the depot where it could easily have been discovered. The spot had been
there long enough to become covered with dust and dirt. The grease was thick
and was spread over a substantial area, which would°logically indicate that, since
cars used the drive, it had accumulated over a period of time. Of the fourteen
judges who considered the case in three courts, nine judges thought that it was
reasonable to conclude from this evidence that the grease had been on the drive
long enough to charge the defendant with constructive notice. On second
appeal, a five-judge majority thought otherwise. As in all cases involving a
question of fact, other precedents are not very persuasive since the controlling
circumstances vary in nearly every case.8 The situation poses a difficult if not
s PROSSER, ToRTS 280-281 (1941).
4 For discussion of the motion for judgment n.o.v., as utilized in Pennsylvania, see 6
STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAcnCB 386-412 (1936).
5 See 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAcncE 75-76 and 407-410 (1936) for discussion
and citations.
6 For discussion of probative value of evidence and logical inferences see 1 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §26 et seq. (1940).
7 When there is direct evidence as to the length of time that the condition has existed,
the courts appear to be more willing to submit the issue to the jury, although there is still
the question of fact as to whether the time was long enough to charge the defendant with
constructive notice. In Van Wye v. Robbins, 48 Cal. App. 660, 120 P. (2d) 507 (1941),
where the plaintiff proved that the grease spot upon which he fell had been on the parking
lot for twenty minutes, the court held that constructive notice was a jury question. In
Langley v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 46 R.I. 394, 131 A. 194 (1925), the court held that
it was. a jury question where peanuts had been upon the store floor for one hour and ten
minutes prior to the time that the plaintiff slipped on them. Compare Burke v. National
India Rubber Co., 21 R.I. 446, 44 A. 307 (1899), where the court held that three hours was
an insufficient length of time to charge an employer with constructive notice of grease upon
a factory floor.
s Compare the following cases: Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Dempsey, 201 Ark.
71, 143 S.W. (2d) 564 (1940) (court reversed jury verdict for the plaintiff, who had
slipped on banana peel in defendant's grocery store, on the ground that there was not
enough evidence to show that the peel had been on the floor long enough to charge
defendant with constructive notice); Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 13 Wash. (2d) 573, 126
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impossible problem for plaintiffs in similar cases who have no way of proving
how long a dangerous condition has existed if the jury is not allowed to draw
reasonable inferences from evidence relating to the appearance, location and
size of the hazard. What type of circumstantial evidence could a plaintiff in
this position submit in order to assure a jury determination in Pennsylvania?9
The court in the principal case indicated that if there had been evidence that ,
there were other footprints on the spot the case could have gone to the jury.10
It j,s suggested that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that the grease had been on the drive for some time, and that the
court, in reversing the jury finding on this point, extended its appellate authority
further than was justified by the facts of the case.11
Charles E. Oldfather, S.Ed.

P. (2d) 44 (1942) (court allowed jury to find for the plaintiff, who had slipped on a
pickle in defendant's restaurant, where evidence showed that bus boys were on duty to
keep the Hoor clean and there was evidence that the floor probably had not been swept
that day); Bremer v. W.W. Smith, Inc., 126 Pa. Super. 408, 191 A. 395 (1937) (court
sustained defendant's motion for a judgment n.o.v. in action for injuries sustained by plaintiff when he fell into a hole in a J_)arking lot and the evidence showed that many cars had
run over the hole, and the size of the hole); O'Leary v. Smith, 255 Mass. 121, 150 N.E.
878 (1926) (court directed a verdict for the defendant in case where plaintiff fell on a
piece of pie in defendant's restaurant, although the defendant admitted that the Hoor had
not been swept that morning or the night before).
9 For an enumeration of relevant circumstances which the jury could consider in a
case where plaintiff slipped on a bag of peanuts in a store, see Lan.ltley v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., note 7 supra. Many of these circumstances would appear to be applicable to the accident in the principal case.
,
10 See Mack v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 247 Pa. 598, 93 A. 618 (1915).
11 The dissenting judge cited Hagen v. Standard Oil Co. of Pennsylvania, 119 Pa.
Super. 337, 181 A. 458 (1935), as being precisely in point with the principal case. In
that case there was no direct evidence as to how long the grease upon which the plaintiff
fell had been on the driveway. The court held that the issue of constructive notice was a
question of fact for the jury.

